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Book Reviews 
PUBLIUS FOR ALL OF US 
THE STORY OF THE FEDERALIST: HOW 
HAMILTON AND MADISON RECONCEIVED 
AMERICA. By Dan T. Coenen. 1 Twelve Tables Press. 
2007. Pp. xi+ 406. $28.95 paper. 
Brannon P. Denning" 
The eighty-five essays written by Alexander Hamilton and 
James Madison (with an assist from John Jay)-known 
collectively as The Federalist- have attained canonical status 
among the documents of the Founding Era. And yet for all of 
the ink spilled recently over the Founders and the Framing Era, 
little recent attention has been given to The Federalist itself. One 
of the most famous popular commentaries on The Federalist, 
Garry Wills's Explaining America, is over twenty-five years old. 
Other treatments are either older or geared towards the 
specialist.3 That gap in the literature makes Dan Coenen's The 
Story ofThe Federalist particularly timely.4 
Contrary to what one might think by reading the title, 
Coenen has not simply written a narrative telling the story of 
how Madison, Hamilton, and Jay came to write the papers, or 
the role that the papers played (or didn't play) in the 
1. Universitv Professor and Harmon W. Caldwell Chair in Constitutional Law. 
University of Geo;gia School of Law. 
2. Professor and Director of Faculty Development. Cumberland School of Law. 
Samford University. Thanks to Dan Coenen for a careful reading of a prior draft. 
3. See, e.g., DAVID F. EPSTEIN. THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 
(1984): GOTTFRIED DIETZ. THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE 
GOVERNMENT (1960): MORTON WHITE. PHILOSOPHY. THE FEDERALIST. AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1987): GARRY WILLS. EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 
(1981). 
4. Michael I. Meyerson has recently published Liberty's Blueprint: How Madison 
and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, Defined the Constitution, and Made 
Democracy Safe for the World (2008). which argues. among other things. that The 
Federalist had an enormous impact on the success of the ratification effort. 
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Constitution ·s eventual ratification. That story is included, but 
sandwiched in between Coenen's account of the essays' writing 
and publication is a rich and accessible introduction to The 
Federalist's political thought. 
Foremost among the book's strengths is Coenen's deft 
organization. A lover of mercy, Coenen does not frog march 
readers through each of The Federalist's eighty-five essays. 
Instead, he organizes his book into five parts: Parts I and V tell 
the story of The Federalist's origin and execution, along with its 
role in the ratification of the Constitution and its lasting impact 
on constitutional law and American political thought. 
Sandwiched in between, however, is an analysis of the work 
itself. Part II explains the rhetorical style of the essays.' Part III 
describes The Federalist's case for change, which was not as 
obvious to all as it was to the Constitution's prominent backers. 
Part IV then takes up The Federalist's brief for the new 
government the Constitution had created. 
I. 
In the Preface, Coenen offers an explanation for the lack of 
interest in The Federalist relative to the enormous interest shown 
over the last ten years in the Framers themselves and in 
Framing-era history. "There are just too many obstacles,'' he 
writes. "the coverage of technical topics, an unfamiliar literary 
style. allusions to then-current but now-forgotten events, the 
length of the work, its density and detail" (p. ix). His intention. 
then. is to situate the papers in context and tell their story. as 
well as "lay out the central messages of The Federalist in a 
readable fashion" and "consider how the papers matter today" 
(p. x). His hope. he writes. is "to pique interest in the papers." 
and to encourage people to read the original (p. xi). 
He begins with the origins of the essays. Troubled by the 
prospects for the Constitution's ratification in New York, 
Hamilton sought a seat at New York's ratifying convention, and 
then embarked on a writing campaign to produce a 
comprehensive set of essays favoring ratification. After several 
prominent persons turned him down, James Madison, in town 
for a session of the Confederation Congress, agreed to 
5. This part draws on Dan T. Coenen. A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument 
of The Federalist and Its Impact on Constitutional Interpretation. 56 DUKE L.J. 469 
(2006 ). 
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collaborate, as did John Jay (p. 5). Illness forced Jay to bow out. 
leaving this unlikely pair- the volatile, confident Hamilton and 
the shy, bookish Madison-with the laboring oar. And labor 
they did. Hamilton's Federalist No. I appeared on October 27. 
1787, with Jay's Federalist No. 2 appearing three days later: 
Madison's first, Federalist No. IO, appeared a little less than a 
month after Hamilton's on November 22. 1787 (pp. 8. 13). The 
last of the eighty-five essays appeared an astonishing seven 
months after the first on May 28. 1788." "[T]he pace of 
production was breathtaking. Altogether, the essayists pumped 
out over 190,000 words. more than three essays per week. and 
almost 2.300 words per essay" (p. 16). Initially published in one 
of several local papers. "[ e ]ach of the essays, after its initial 
printing, appeared in at least one additional newspaper: many 
appeared in all four," though publication outside New Y ark was 
"limited" (pp. 17, 18). 
Hamilton and Madison had little time to consult with one 
another on each other's essays (p. 15). and thus Coenen notes 
that it is "not surprising that some historians have reported the 
discovery of internal dissonance, if not outright schizophrenia. in 
the pages of The Federalist" (p. 21). Others have stressed how 
similar the papers are, and how consistent over the course of the 
essays. Coenen stresses the consistency of "Publius"7 rather than 
emphasizing any "schizophrenia" (p. 22). Moreover. he follows 
many historians in attributing authorship of the "disputed" 
papers to Madison instead of Hamilton (p. 22). Hamilton and 
Madison were to go their separate ways politically after their 
historic collaboration, but the quantity and quality of the essays 
produced continue to command our respect.' 
II. 
Having identified an "unfamiliar literary style" (p. ix) as one 
of the barriers to contemporary appreciation of The Federalist. it 
6. Most know that Jay produced only a few essays. Coenen writes that illness was 
the primary reason. Jay did return to contribute the Federalis£ No. 6-1. his fifth. in March 
of 1788. but ··[a] month later. the unlucky statesman was hit in the head with a brick 
during a street riot"" and was unable to 'contribute any more essays (p. 14. footnote 
omitted). 
7. ""Publius·· was the pen name used in the essays (p. 5). 
8. For those keeping score. even with Madison being awarded authorship of the 
disputed papers. ""Hamilton's contribution was preponderant. The New Yorker produced 
51 essays. spread over 352 pages. as compared to Madison's 29 tracts and 221 pages·· (p. 
22. footnote omitted). ' 
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is fitting that Coenen begins his discussion with The Federalist's 
rhetorical style. The papers, he writes, "embodied, first and 
foremost, a vigorous effort at persuasion aimed at a particular 
audience situated in a particular time and place. That effort 
centered on reasoned argument" as well as "appeals to emotion 
and credibility'' (p. 27). They were, at bottom, "campaign 
literature" (p. 28) and addressed the pressing issues of the day: 
the weakness of the Confederation government, interstate trade 
conflicts, and the specter of violence in the form of Shay's 
Rebellion (p. 29). The essays "did not draw [their] greatest 
strength from appeals to lofty abstractions" but rather from 
appeals to the circumstances of the time and the good sense of 
the authors' audience (p. 28). 
In fact. Hamilton and Madison were not above a little 
flattery. They argued that the virtuous and generous citizens of 
all the United States would, when the facts were before them, 
see how the new government was essential to the future success 
of the country. For while the particular problems of New York 
were discussed (pp. 30-31), Publius's essays were not entirely 
parochial- appealing to planters, manufacturers, merchants, 
urban and rural dwellers alike (p. 30). Further, they invited 
readers to draw lessons from history, both ancient and modern, 
in support of their project (pp. 32-37). They often portrayed 
opponents of ratification (whom they shrewdly characterized as 
"antifederalists") as succumbing to undue suspicion, even 
paranoia (p. 39). By contrast, "the voice of The Federalist took 
on the tone of a trustworthy and omniscient neutral, marked by 
a rhetorical detachment calculated to contribute to the 
credibility of the overall project" (p. 42). This neutrality was 
bolstered by the authors' willingness to discuss the Constitution's 
shortcomings9 and concede that some of the line-drawing 
involved in its provisions was arbitrary (pp. 44-45). But, the 
essays often pointed out, the document was the product of 
politically necessary compromises (p. 43). Both strategies 
"buil[ t] a bridge of candor to their readers designed to reinforce 
the credibility of their larger project" (p. 45). 
Both men recognized the utility of non-reasoned arguments 
as well. Appeals to emotion, appeals to logic leavened "by 
9. Coenen also notes that both men defended provisions each had vigorously 
condemned at the Philadelphia Convention. Hamilton infamously supported life terms 
for the President and Senators. Madison had vigorously objected to equal representation 
of states in the Senate (p. 46 ). 
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mixing color, symbolism, and imagery'' as well as ''invocation of 
America's revolutionary heritage" (pp. 51. 47), all played 
important roles in The Federalist. As noted above, the essays 
mocked antifederalist concerns with varying degrees of 
aggressiveness, occasionally hinting that the objections to the 
Constitution were so far-fetched they must be the product not of 
real concern but of more sinister motives (p. 48). "With the 
repeated tying of aspersion to reasoned argument," Coenen 
writes, "Publius sowed the seeds of skepticism at a visceral level. 
By portraying antifederalists as dark-hearted as well as wrong-
headed, Hamilton and Madison appealed to deep-seated human 
sensibilities connected up with pride, caution, indignation, and 
even self-preservation" (p. 50). 
Further, "[t]ime and again, Madison and Hamilton aligned 
the Constitution, its framers, and its defenders with the spirit of 
the American Revolution and the intellectual forces that had 
given that revolution birth" (p. 53). In part, this invocation was 
defensive, helping to "undercut concerns about the purported 
unlawfulness of the Philadelphia Convention" (p. 54, footnote 
omitted). Because the Revolution had come to be seen as a 
unifying event for the nascent country, tapping into that 
nationalist sentiment had obvious uses when the authors of The 
Federalist were asking readers to undertake another leap of faith 
in throwing the Articles of Confederation aside for an entirely 
new type of government. 
But Madison and Hamilton were not content merely to rest 
on stating the logical or even the emotional case for the 
Constitution. Both were practical men; both were very much 
concerned with the pressing issues of the day. So The Federalist 
went on to press the case for a strengthened central government 
capable of meeting those challenges, and to describe in detail 
how the authors saw the various parts of the new government 
working-and to explain why a decrease in liberty did not 
ineluctably follow from increased central power. It is in Parts III 
and IV that Coenen hits his stride, first canvassing the themes to 
which Publius recurred; then discussing Hamilton and Madison's 
vigorous defense of the government that emerged from the 
Constitution. 
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III. 
Coenen entitles the third part of The Story of The 
Federalist, "Themes for a Nation." He explains that Hamilton 
and Madison's key task was selling the need for "strengthening 
the American union" (p. 59). The authors further invoked the 
idea, often associated with Adam Smith, of yoking private 
interest to the public good; and offered a particular take on the 
ideology of "republicanism." These themes, which form a 
superstructure for the rest of the papers, are important to 
understanding the more specific defenses deployed against 
opponents of ratification. 
Encouraging affinity for a strong national government of 
the "United States" was a tall order in an age when many 
Americans, following Jefferson, considered their state to be their 
"country." And yet creating such bonds of affection was 
essential if the United States was to survive. Several problems 
were present in the late 1780s; each looked to get worse, not 
better. given the Articles' relative impotence. First, the parlous 
state of the country's finances was giving rise to local uprisings, 
like Shay's Rebellion. Second, interstate trade friction 
threatened to ignite, becoming something more serious. This 
instability, in turn, left the United States open to attack from 
foreign powers eager to carve the U.S. up among them. 
Hamilton and Madison's support for the Constitution was based 
in part on the belief that the new government would have the 
tools to meet these challenges. Publius sought to convince 
readers this would be the case-that federal authority was 
"vitalize(d]," but not too much (p. 60). 
Taking these concerns in reverse order, many of the early 
essays cited the danger of external attacks and the need to 
prepare for them as a reason for centralizing power. 111 For 
Hamilton. Coenen writes. "(h]istory revealed that a loose 
assemblage of states would not service this vital need" (p. 65). 
Moreover. a strong military- a navy especially- was needed to 
protect commercial shipping; thus did Hamilton's views on 
national security dovetail with his vision for America as a 
nascent economic power (p. 69). "Through all these discussions 
ran the demand for a foreign policy that rested on the twin 
foundations of union and strength," observes Coenen (p. 69). 
10. '"According to The Federalist. forestalling the dangers of military attack 
provided the leading reason to build a strong central government'" (p. 6R). 
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Union meant that ''the central government needed the powers to 
maintain standing armies. to outfit a navy, and to call on state 
militias in times of national need" (p. 70). This power would, in 
turn, ensure that the country's government could credibly 
threaten the use of force if needed to protect its interests.'' 
Other threats were closer to home. "For Hamilton and 
Madison, the drift toward disunion fostered by the Articles of 
Confederation all but ensured future armed clashes among the 
former allies of the Revolution" (p. 70). Chief among the sources 
of friction were the accidents of geography that gave some states 
advantages when it came to trade-advantages states like New 
York exploited to the detriment of its neighbors. 12 Publius 
argued that other, looser confederations throughout history had 
come to grief once their members began fighting for trade and 
territory. Such disputes would then invite interference from 
abroad, as European countries formed alliances with various 
factions, playing each against the other (p. 73). A strong central 
government, one with control over interstate commerce and with 
its own source of funds, could counterbalance such centrifugal 
tendencies. 
Finally, a strong government was needed to repel localized 
troubles, like Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts. "According to 
Publius, a strong central government would counter the risk of 
domestic insurrection in two powerful ways" (p. 75). First, 
plotters would have to organize extensively in order to subjugate 
the whole country, or even a part of it, raising the chances of 
discovery. Second, the central government could bring enormous 
resources to bear on local problems, to prevent them from 
spreading (p. 75). 
Publius's case for Union may seem like overkill, observes 
Coenen, because even many antifederalists conceded the need 
for augmented federal powers, including some independent 
revenue-raising power and the power to regulate interstate 
commerce. But Hamilton and Madison did not want fence-sitters 
to think that these adjustments to the Articles were sufficient, 
and pressed hard their case for an even stronger government. 
11. "A government charged with waging war must always be prepared for it. and a 
government required to bargain with foreign powers must be able to back up its 
ultimatums with more than idle bluster" (p. 70). 
12. For more on this. and the Constitution's response. see Brannon P. Denning. 
Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine. 94 KY. L.J. 37 (2005-2006). 
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Coenen writes that "[a] general emphasis on the value of the 
union-particularly as a counterweight to war-rounded out the 
development of" the themes in all eighty-five essays of The 
Federalist (p. 77). 
Hamilton and Madison knew that citizens harbored honest 
worries about the Constitution's dramatic shift of power to 
the central government. They also knew, however, that they 
held two powerful cards in their hand. The first was the 
shared belief, born of the Revolution, that strength and safety 
lay in union. The second was the shared fear that the nation's 
existing authority had reached a point of such "desperate 
extremity" that it lacked the capacity to discharge even the 
most basic responsibilities of government. With powerful 
arguments, Hamilton and Madison reinforced this belief and 
played on this fear, keeping in constant view the specter of 
war and the terrible dangers it posed (p. 77). 
If persuading a skeptical populace to invest a central 
government with greater powers than any would have imagined 
a decade earlier seemed a tall order. Madison took it upon 
himself to further persuade readers that much of what they knew 
about "civic republicanism" needed to be unlearned. In 
Coenen's illuminating chapter on The Federalist No. 10, one of 
the most famous documents in American political history, he 
explains how Madison accomplished this. 13 
"The first seminal contribution of No. 10 lay in its effort to 
debunk [the] lionization of the small republic" (p. 80). 
Presciently, Madison sensed that the United States had potential 
to be one of the largest political units in history. Even the union 
of thirteen states was too large for some antifederalists. The fear 
was that large republics would fall prey to "faction," a pejorative 
term in the eighteenth century, on par with "parties" that all 
deemed fatal to a true republic. Madison, however, turned this 
logic on its head. In his view, small republics were the ones most 
likely to fail. Factions were inevitable; ''no republic-whatever 
its size-could instill in 'every citizen the same opinions, the 
same passions, and the same interests'" (p. 80, quoting Federalist 
No. 10). Rather than attempt to suppress factions' emergence, 
Madison sought "to place the public well-being over their own 
13. There is a large literature on Federalist No. 10 and how influential it was or 
wasn't in its day. Coenen acknowledges this literature in the notes. but he explains 
Madison's essay on its own terms. He also reprints Federalist No. 10 in its entirety in 
Appendix B (pp. 373-79). 
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private interests" (p. 81). "In other words," writes Coenen, 
"Madison stood ready not only to assert that the argument in 
favor of small republics was misguided; he was also prepared to 
claim that a much strengthened central government offered 
powerful advantages in checking the excesses of factional 
power" (p. 82, footnote omitted). 
Further, Madison argued that majority factions were "the 
greatest danger in self-ruling nations" because they could ride 
roughshod over the rights of minorities (p. 82). But to suppress 
the emergence of such factions was fruitless, according to 
Madison, because such efforts led to tyranny and, ultimately, the 
surrender of republican government. Better to set them against 
one another in a large republic with a strong central government 
so that (1) the sheer size of the country could hamper efforts by 
any one faction to consolidate power with each acting to check 
the overweening ambition of the others, and (2) "[t]he filtering 
process of representative government ... would work best" by 
having politics play on a national, rather than a local level (pp. 
84-85). 
Coenen notes the academic commentary that has 
mushroomed around Federalist No. 10, but takes no sides, 
concluding simply that "one thing is clear: Madison celebrated 
the value of including multiple groups with different outlooks 
within the body politic .... Madison's emphasis on inclusive 
voting regimes reflected an attitude of openness to new forms of 
human interaction" (p. 88). While it cannot be doubted that 
large numbers of Americans were initially excluded from 
participation, either because of sex or race or (at first) wealth, 
the Constitution showed the way for those groups' inclusion in 
the political community in the years to come (pp. 89-90). 
Further, though it was not necessarily apparent to Publius at the 
time, "No. 10 cemented the ... proposition that injustice prevails 
when 51% of the citizenry captures 100% of state-created 
benefits" (p. 91 ). The logic of that insight- that majorities could 
be tyrannous-would lead to Madison's fight for the Bill of 
Rights in the First Congress. 14 
Coenen closes with some provocative questions about the 
political theory of Federalist No. 10. Does Madison's theory of 
contending factions indeed secure peace and stability, or does 
14. See generally RICHARD LABCNSKI. JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2008). 
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it simply entrench the status quo and frustrate revolutionary 
and progressive politics? Whatever the answers, Coenen 
claims that such questions "do not diminish the luminosity of 
Federalist No. 10. Rather they reaffirm its status as the key 
point of reference for judging the work of our constitutional 
regime" (p. 91 ). Its themes "of inclusion, collaboration, rights-
mindedness, and public-spiritedness" continue to have 
relevance today (p. 91). 
Contemporary historical scholarship abounds with 
discussions of ·'republicanism" and the Framers' relationship 
with it. There is no doubt that the Founders considered 
themselves ardent "republicans"- as opposed to "democrats" or 
"monarchists." They even guaranteed each state a "republican 
form of government" in the Constitution." The Federalist 
abounds with assurances that the proposed Constitution was not 
only republican, but that it was more republican than the 
Articles or other supposed paradigms of republicanism. 
But what was republicanism? Historians continue to debate 
the question, but Coenen argues that it had, for Publius, three 
main tenets: ''(1) the ultimate sovereignty of the people, (2) the 
republican nature of all branches of government, and (3) the 
idea of distancing the people from the operations of their 
government and from future control of the Constitution itself" 
(p. 93). 
The first of these is relatively straightforward- the 
legitimacy of the government and its actions depended upon the 
consent of those on whose behalf it acted. This was signified by, 
inter alia, the special ratifying conventions that debated and 
voted on the proposed Constitution. This was, moreover, a 
national act, with the implication that the Union was something 
that would be more than a mere confederation of states (pp. 94-
95).16 Moreover, Article V made clear the path for the People to 
assert their sovereignty through constitutional amendments or, 
ultimately, another constitutional convention. 
By "republicanism in all the branches," Coenen means that 
the authors of The Federalist departed in significant respects 
from the received traditions of English government. In the latter, 
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV.§ 4. 
16. For an excellent treatment of the conventions. their origins in Revolutionary-
era state constitutions. and their significance. see DAVID E. KYYIG. EXPLICIT AND 
AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITL'TION. 1776-1995 (1996). 
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societal classes are represented by different elements: the King 
and Lords representing the "few" and Commons representing 
"the many." While the House roughly corresponded to 
Commons, the Senate did not represent existing aristocratic 
elements in American society, but rather its membership 
''hinged on choices made by state legislatures, which (because of 
their closeness to the people) had a republican complexion of 
their own" (p. 97). Even with its longer terms, "the Senate's 
purpose was to give its own expression to the popular mind-
albeit with emphasis on that part of the mind that saw special 
value in 'stability and continuity' in society and government" (p. 
97, footnote omitted). Further, the President was elected, held 
office for a term of years, and was at least indirectly accountable 
to the populace through those elections and through 
impeachment (p. 97). "Even the federal judiciary," Coenen 
notes, "had republican roots. Although given unlimited terms, 
judges would take office only upon appointment by the 
President and confirmation by the Senate" (p. 97, footnote 
omitted). The institution of judicial review itself bore a 
republican gloss because it could be characterized as vindicating 
the People's sovereign will. as reflected in the Constitution, 
against ultra vires actions undertaken by agents of the electorate 
(p. 98). 
But republicanism was not synonymous with "democracy"; 
in fact, the Constitution is anti-democratic in some ways. 
Equality in the Senate and the role of the electoral college in the 
selection of the President are probably the two best-known ways 
in which the Constitution can be said to be anti-democratic (or, 
more precisely. anti-majoritarian). The Federalist's emphasis on 
"refining" the popular will highlights the authors' hope that 
enlightened popular will would be expressed by members of the 
federal government. This led to charges of elitism by 
antifederalists (p. 99). The Constitution does not provide for 
instructions, whereby voters would control the actions of elected 
officials once they assumed office. Nor can voters recall elected 
officials before the next election (pp. 100-01 ). But for Hamilton 
and Madison, these were "features" not "bugs." As Coenen 
summarizes: "In the view of Publius, the people (or their state 
representatives) were to choose federal legislators but then turn 
them loose. This might seem undemocratic, but that was the 
point. A meaningful level of insulation would help federal 
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officeholders rise above factional politics to pursue a greater 
good" (p. 102). 
Moreover, as Coenen notes, there is no method for 
continuous involvement by "the People" in constitutional 
reform, either. In pointed contrast to Thomas Jefferson, who 
advocated nullifying all laws-including all constitutions-every 
twenty-five years, Madison hoped to cultivate an almost 
religious feeling of veneration toward the Constitution. Such 
veneration, he argued in The Federalist, would not be 
forthcoming if the document could be too easily altered. "In 
sum," Coenen writes, "the Jeffersonian approach would-on the 
Madisonian view-threaten the people's Constitution with too 
much tinkering by the people themselves. Just as representatives 
needed independence from voters once they took office, so too 
did the framework of government require insulation from 
popular manipulation once it was put in place" (p. 103). Thus 
while the sovereign People could assert itself and alter the 
Constitution, the supermajority requirements both to propose 
and ratify amendments ensured they would be rare, as indeed 
they have been. 
IV. 
In his final section on The Federalist itself, Coenen describes 
what he calls the "architecture of equilibrium" created by the 
Constitution and defended by Madison and Hamilton-their 
defense of the specifics of the new government. He begins with 
Publius' defense against the charge that the Constitution had 
violated the sacred commandment that the powers of 
government shall be separated. He then discusses The 
Federalist's defense of each branch of government, as well as the 
ultimately unsuccessful response to complaints that the 
Constitution was fatally flawed because it omitted a bill of rights. 
Unlike contemporary state constitutions, the Constitution 
contained no explicit separation-of-powers provision. 17 That 
omission was alarming enough, but to the opponents of the 
17. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. L art. XXX ( 1780) ("In the government of this 
commonwealth. the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers. or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial 
powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive 
powers. or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws. and not of men."). 
Most current state constitutions retain some form of a separation of powers clause. See, 
e.g .. ALA. CONST. art. IlL§ 43. 
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Constitution the powers of the various officers looked 
frighteningly mixed. The President vetoing legislation? The 
Senate approving treaties and confirming executive officers? 
The Court holding acts of the legislature unconstitutional? What 
was going on here? Whatever it was. the antifederalists were 
sure that nothing good could come of such unprecedented 
mixing of powers. Like Patrick Henry. they "smelt a rat."' 1' 
Hamilton and Madison responded that what the 
Constitution of 1787 proposed to give the people was not a mere 
parchment barrier against tyranny. but a real security against 
abuse of power- the end of separation of powers in the first 
place. This was achieved. paradoxically. by the very mixing of 
powers decried by the Constitution's opponents. Though. as 
Coenen notes, ''[t)he terms 'checks and balances· and 
'separation of powers' ... appear nowhere in the Constitution 
itself,'' the phrases "'capture in a shorthand way themes at the 
heart of The Federalist" (p. 107). As conceived by the 
Constitution, "each institution of government-occupied by 
persons naturally protective of their own turf- had to have 
weapons with which to counteract attempted power grabs by 
competing centers of authority" (p. 109). Thus. the document 
sought a kind of "equilibrium.. and guarded against 
concentration of power into any one of the three branches (p. 
109). 
Further, this horizontal separation was complemented by a 
vertical separation of powers between the federal and the state 
governments. "Recognizing states as autonomous entities meant 
that both they and the central government would carry out 
critical functions. This division of functions meant in turn. that 
the central government and the states would keep a close eye on 
one another" (p. 109. footnotes omitted). This was an entirely 
new experiment in government: so revolutionary that Justice 
Kennedy once described it as "split[ing] the atom of 
sovereignty.··~~ Madison called this dual division of power a 
"'double security" against the concentration of power he defined 
18. When asked why he refused a place as a delegate to the 1787 Philadelphia 
Convention. the famous Patriot is said to have remarked. "I smelt a rat.'' Seep. IX8: Paul 
Finkelman. Turning Losers Into Winners: Whar Can We Learn. If Am·thing, From the 
Antifederalists. 79 TEX. L. REV. 849. X71 (2001) (book review). 
19. U.S. Term Limits. Inc. \.Thornton. 514 U.S. 779. 838 (1995) (Kennedv. 1.. 
concurring) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty ... ). For an argument. that 
Kennedy's metaphor was not quite apt. see Mark R. Killenbeck. The Pln·sics of 
Federalism. 51 U. KA:\. L. REV. 1 (200:2). 
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as tyranny itself (p. 110). Madison in particular labored against 
attacks by antifederalists who predicted-accurately, as it 
happened- that the division of power would exert a centripetal 
pull towards the central government (pp. 112-18). 
Madison and Hamilton spent much of The Federalist 
carefully describing and defending the powers given by the 
Constitution to each branch of government and parrying attacks 
from antifederalists that the powers given were either too great, 
given to the wrong branch in violation of separation of powers. 
or both. Coenen devotes a chapter a piece to Publius's defense 
of the Constitution's delegation of power to the three great arms 
of the federal government. 
If you took a poll today asking which is ''the most 
dangerous" branch, I suspect most people would answer either 
the judiciary or the executive branch. Coenen points out, 
however, that in the late 1780s, the conventional wisdom was 
that legislatures often posed dangers to liberty- especially to 
that of property holders or the politically unorthodox. As 
Coenen notes. the Framers "faced the ever-ticklish task of 
combining energy, stability, and an attentiveness to private 
rights" (p. 124, footnote omitted). "On the one hand. the framers 
had to avoid impeding legislative prerogatives too much. 
particularly in light of basic principles of majority rule. On the 
other hand. they well knew that legislative activism carried with 
it risks of factional oppression" (p. 124). The Framers threaded 
this needle. according to Coenen, by requiring bicamerality, a 
representative House, the complementary Senate, and by 
limiting federal legislative power to those enumerated in Article 
I. section 8. "The combination of these elements," he writes, 
"produced a legislative body unlike any the world had previously 
seen" (p. 124). 
As to the first, "the framers' endorsement of bicameralism 
reflected much more than a compromise between frustrated 
delegates who represented large and small states. The 
requirement of joint action would promote deliberation, 
contribute to stability, and confound the sway of 'passions' and 
·prejudices' that too often polluted the work of legislative 
assemblies·· (p. 127, footnote omitted). Of the two houses, the 
House of Representatives fulfilled one of Publius's criteria for 
the "construction of a true republic'': "the creation of at least 
one legislative body immediately accountable to a broad 
electorate" (p. 127). And, as Publius pointed out, decisions 
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about the composition of that electorate were left for states to 
determine. Madison also defended the two-year term. and the 
size of the House, which critics thought to small to ensure real 
representation. 211 
While the House would have a "populist character oriented 
to near-term goals," the Senate "with its lengthy terms. indirect 
elections, more exacting qualification rules. and ensured 
maintenance of institutional continuity" meant it would "take 
the longer view'' and provide security against the passions of 
transient majorities (p. 132). Naturally, antifederalists saw the 
Senate as a crypto-aristocratic cabal whose function would be to 
frustrate the "democratic" initiatives of the House. Publius 
refuted such charges, but, of course, there was a grain of truth in 
the antifederalist allegations. 
Antifederalists also objected to the powers given the new 
legislature, however constituted. "Favorite targets of objection 
included newly created powers to organize and discipline state 
militias, to levy taxes of almost any sort. to oversee federal 
elections, and to maintain standing armies." (p. 135). Publius 
responded first by noting that the real issue involved 
empowering Congress to regulate interstate commerce and have 
independent revenue-raising power without depending on states 
(p. 135). "Second, the authors of the Federalist parried discrete 
challenges to the Constitution's particularized grants of power" 
(p. 136). The upshot of Publius's defense was threefold: "(1) the 
importance of creating effectual powers of federal fundraising, 
(2) the value of uniform federal regulation of foreign and 
interstate commerce, and (3) the need for broad discretion in the 
choice of means to carry federal powers into effect" (p. 136). As 
to the second, Coenen makes a characteristically shrewd 
observation that "the new national power over commerce was 
not so much about commerce as it was about union. With this 
grant of power, the framers sought to cultivate a national 
mindset that would lead Americans to view themselves as one 
cohesive people" (p. 141). 
Not surprisingly, it fell to Hamilton to defend the new 
executive created by the Constitution. Many Framers regretted 
the fetters the new states placed on governors and the lack of 
20. "The Constitution provided that the House ... would create a ratio of roughly 
one representative for every 5.000 to 6.000 voters. as opposed to one representative for 
every 500 to 600 voters as was the case in most states·· (p. 129. footnote omitted). 
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any executive in the Articles. But fears of executive abuse 
recalled by their colonial experience made many fearful of an 
officer that. at best. might equal some of the arbitrary colonial 
governors and. at worst. could attempt to set himself up as 
monarch. Hamilton derided such fears as so much paranoia and 
argued that all that was sought was '"energy'' in the executive 
branch-energy '"to act effectively for the nation" (p. 146). 
According to Hamilton. '"energy came from four sources: (1) 
unity in the executive. (2) continuity in office. (3). possession of 
broad powers. and ( 4) independence from the other branches" 
(p. 146. footnote omitted). 
Unity meant that there would be one and only one 
president. As Hamilton explained. "both strength and restraint 
would come from lodging executive power in one person" (p. 
147). A dual presidency. on the other hand. would find itself 
hampered by disagreement and would not be as transparent. 
since it would not be evident whom to blame for bad policies. 
Placing responsibility in one person would also tend to make the 
holder circumspect in the execution of duties and careful in the 
selection of personnel to hold executive office (pp. 147-48). 
The four-year term and the absence (then) of presidential 
term limits. argued Hamilton. ensured continuity and stability-
Hamilton feared radical change. Thus Hamilton warmly 
advocated the wisdom of the presidential veto over legislation. 
subject to congressional override. Such an executive check 
provided. with bicameralism. a second check on bad legislation 
(p. 155). He predicted it would not be used frequently. Hamilton 
also vigorously defended the President's preeminence in the 
conduct of foreign affairs and in the appointment of federal 
officials. 
Finally. history had shown the need to make executives 
independent of legislatures. "Energy in the executive would be 
more bane than benefit if the legislature could direct that 
energy into schemes of factional oppression" (p. 158). The 
President's salary was insulated from legislative meddling. and 
one could not serve in both the legislative and executive 
departments simultaneously- there was even a prohibition on 
a former legislator's service in the executive branch if, prior to 
taking office. the legislator had voted to raise the salary for that 
office.21 
21. The emoluments clause. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 6. cl. 1. has occasioned the 
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Article III was the shortest article in the Constitution: there 
was little discussion of the judiciary or its powers in Philadelphia. 
The lack of discussion probably stemmed from consensus-most 
thought that the omission of a federal forum from the Articles 
was a serious flaw. The Framers remedied that by establishing a 
Supreme Court. then leaving Congress the option of establishing 
subordinate federal tribunals if it wished- a compromise 
intended to forestall complaints that the Constitution's 
proponents sought to strip the state courts of all power. Article 
III limited the jurisdiction of federal courts to matters of 
national (and international) importance and gave Congress the 
ability to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
Independence was secured through life tenure, and insulation 
for judges' salaries from legislative retaliation. Further. the 
manner in which judges would attain office was insulated. to a 
significant degree. from the vagaries of public opinion: the 
President would nominate judges and the Senate would confirm 
them. 
Courts would play their role in maintaining the 
"equilibrium" in the government by exercising judicial review. 
which Hamilton famously defended in Federalist No. 78. Despite 
Article III's silence on the question. many at the Philadelphia 
Convention seemed to assume that courts would exercise some 
independent review over federal and state legislation for 
compliance with the Constitution.cc And recent scholarship by 
William Treanor strongly suggests that judicial review was an 
accepted practice by the time of the Ratification, even if its 
precise scope was still contested.c' 
lowering of salaries for former legislators who assume executive branch posts whose 
salaries were increased during their terms in Congress. This ··work-around." called the 
"Saxbe Fix" for William Saxbe. President Nixon's Attornev General. has been 
questioned by some. but seems to have been generally accepted ~s a way to get around 
the Emoluments Clause. See generalll' Mark Tushnet. Constiflltional Workarounds. g7 
TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009) (describing the Saxbe Fix). For doubts about the workaround's 
constitutionality. see Michael Stokes Paulsen. Is Llovd Bentsen Unconstitutional 7 • 46 
STA!'i. L. REV. 907 (1994). 
22. See generally William Michael Treanor. Original Understanding and the 
Whether, Why. and How of Judicial Rniew. 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 218 (2007). 
23. See William Michael Treanor. Judicial Revin,· Before Marburv. 58 STA~. L. 
REV. 455 (2005) (arguing that judicial review was well-estab.lished by the. Framing Era): 
hw st'e Theodore \V. Ruger. "A Question Which Convulses a Nation": The Earl1· 
Republic's Greatest Dehate Ahout the Judicial Revie"· Power. 117 HARV. L. REV. Ri6 
(2004) (describing contested nature of judicial review in the early Republic). 
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On one critical issue, however, Publius misfired: the 
necessity or desirability of a bill of rights. Framer George 
Mason cited the Constitution's lack of a such a bill as his reason 
for not signing. Nevertheless, Hamilton argued that any 
enumeration of rights risked omitting important rights and 
seemed to invite inference that the government possessed 
powers not enumerated in Article I. Hamilton, for example, 
famously argued that the lack of a free press guarantee was 
unnecessary because Article I mentioned nothing about 
congressional control of the press.'~ 
While Coenen sympathetically acknowledges that Publius 
wasn't opposed to rights, he nevertheless rightly cites "deep 
flaws" in their argument against a bill of rights. The no-power-
to-interfere-with-rights argument, for example, ''clashed with 
suggestions made elsewhere in The Federalist that broadly 
implied powers should and did flow from the Necessary and 
Proper Clause" (p. 176). Moreover. the Constitution already 
included some security against contingencies unmentioned in 
Article I. For example. the Constitution's ban on titles of 
nobility "limited no expressly granted power and thus supported 
by implication claims to power no less than would a comparable 
ban on interference with the press" (p. 177, footnote omitted). 
As Coenen also points out, "Publius ignored the helpful 
contribution that a Bill of Rights could make to the proper 
structuring of the federal government. In particular, if federal 
courts were to perform a checking function, they would need 
legal rubrics with which to police the other branches" (p. 177). 
Perhaps more importantly. bills of rights had become common 
features of constitutions-people expected them to be there. 
The lack of one in a document bringing forth a new and untested 
form of government was simply alarming to many. In any event. 
Madison and Hamilton were playing the hand dealt in 
Philadelphia. When it was clear their assurances failed to 
persuade, Madison faithfully cajoled his fellow House members 
to consider one in 1789, during the First Congress when many 
wanted to renege on that promise.25 
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). 
25. See, e.g .. LABUNSKI. supra note 14. 
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V. 
In the final part. Coenen returns to the story of The 
Federalist itself, its role in the ratification of the Constitution, 
and its continuing significance today. He opens with the 
observation that neither Virginia nor New York's ratification 
was technically necessary to the Constitution's coming into being 
because New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify on 
June 21, 1788."" However, given the importance of both states. it 
would have been folly to attempt to make the new nation a going 
concern without them. Coenen writes that a "United States 
without Virginia or New York would be a strange, 
noncontiguous assemblage of territories likely to spin towards 
just the sort of regional balkanization that Hamilton and 
Madison most feared" (p. 187). But to play a role in securing 
ratification, each first had to be elected to his state's ratifying 
convention, which was not assured in either case (pp. 187-204). 
In Virginia, Madison- who initially decided against running 
for a seat in the ratifying convention, only to relent- took on the 
redoubtable Patrick Henry, quietly but expertly parrying 
Henry's rhetorical sorties against the Constitution (pp. 189-91 ). 
Not only did his work on The Federalist pay off, but Madison 
also directed printed sets to be delivered to the state's leaders. In 
the end, Madison's efforts (and the willingness of "Governor 
[Edmund] Randoph and a handful of westerners who broke 
ranks with their antifederalist neighbors" (p. 193)) bore fruit: 
Virginia ratified in a close vote, 89-79 (p. 193). 
Hamilton faced perhaps even longer odds in New York. The 
other members of New York's delegation to Philadelphia pulled 
out months before the Convention's work was complete, leaving 
Hamilton kicking his heels in Philadelphia. Powerful political 
interests in the state resisted incorporation into any national 
scheme it would not be in a position to control. The results of the 
election to the ratifying convention could not have been less 
auspicious. "Forty-six antifederalist candidates had swept to 
victory, in comparison to the federalists' brotherly band of just 
nineteen" (p. 196). However, Hamilton and his brotherly band 
scored an important victory "when perhaps-overconfident 
antifederalists agreed to review the Constitution in clause-by-
clause fashion before any votes were taken'' (p. 197). This both 
26. Bv its terms. when ratified bv nine states. the Constitution would become 
binding on 'those nine. U.S. COr" ST. art. VII. 
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prevented a rush to rejection and allowed Hamilton to bring his 
expertise. honed in the writing of The Federalist. to bear. News 
of Virginia's ratification also buoyed the Federalists' efforts (p. 
198). In the end, ardent antifederalist Melancton Smith proposed 
that New York ratify the Constitution and press for amendments 
later, reserving the right to secede if they were not forthcoming 
(p. 200). This peeled off enough opponents to carry the day for 
ratification. if only by three votes (p. 201 ). 
There is a strong irony that The Federalist had relatively 
little impact on the ratification debate (its raison d'etre), but has 
endured as a key to the meaning of the Constitution long after 
ratification was an accomplished fact. Coenen spends his 
concluding chapter considering The Federalist as "A Work for 
the Ages" (p. 205). Why has it endured? 
One reason is that the essays are of very high quality. 
produced by two of the most brilliant minds of the founding 
generation who also happened to be good writers. Another 
reason is that "it filled an enormous gap. The Constitution sets 
forth rules." writes Coenen, "[i]t does not ... set forth reasons 
for those rules. The Philadelphia Convention left behind no 
explanatory report, and the first-hand accounts of the 
Convention are scarce because delegates agreed to keep their 
proceedings secret" (p. 207). Madison's own notes were not 
published until1840. Further, it provided a coherent justification 
for the whole Constitution, and attempted to demonstrate that 
the government-far from being a concatenation of 
compromises- had a deep structure (pp. 207 -08). This is one 
reason why. as Coenen points out, the judiciary has turned to it 
for aid in interpreting the Constitution (pp. 208-13). By 
Coenen's count. the Court's resort to The Federalist increased 
several-fold in the last decade of the twentieth century and is 
likely to be cited as frequently in the twenty-first (p. 213). It is 
surely no coincidence that the rise in judicial citations 
corresponds to the prominence of originalism in constitutional 
interpretation. even among those judges and justices for whom it 
is not dispositive. 
Whatever the legitimacy or wisdom of judicial (and non-
judicial) reliance on The Federalist,27 it is clearly regarded as a 
legitimate source of constitutional meaning. But Coenen 
encourages us to view the eight-five essays as much more than a 
27. Coenen summarizes the arguments for and against on pp. 219-21. 
2009] BOOK REVIEWS 95 
source for legal cherry-picking. He urges us to admire the effort 
and the quality of the essays, as well as their aim. "In the place of 
a tempestuous, fractious post-revolutionary America," Coenen 
writes, "Publius held up the prospect of a dynamic, yet stable, 
society poised to prosper in government, in commerce, and in 
spirit" (p. 223, footnote omitted). "At bottom,'' he concludes, 
"this was the aim that drove The Federalist Papers" (p. 223). 
* * * 
Measured against the aims that Coenen set for himself in 
the book's introduction- "to pique interest in the papers" (p. 
xi)-his book succeeds brilliantly. It is accessible to the general 
reader, yet is useful even to the specialist. The Story of The 
Federalist is an ideal companion to Herbert J. Storing's What the 
Antifederalists Were For; both, moreover, are best read with a 
good edition of The Federalist and Storing's selections from his 
The Complete Antifederalist.'x Reading Coenen's book, the 
teacher in me is saddened that few undergraduates now are 
familiar with The Federalist and that there is little room in law 
schools' constitutional law courses for an introduction. 
More's the pity, too, because Coenen's book is especially 
well-suited for classroom use. He includes in appendices 
complete copies of the Constitution and Federalist Nos. 10, 51, 
and 78. There is a helpful general index, as well as an index 
listing the number of each essay and where it is mentioned in the 
work. Experienced scholars will find much of interest in the 
lengthy endnotes section, which runs to over one hundred pages. 
But one may read Coenen's book with nary a glance at the 
notes, because he is skilled at letting Madison and Hamilton 
(and Jay!) speak for themselves, without burdening the reader 
with lengthy block quotations. 
Coenen only departs from his generalist orientation on a 
few occasions when he discusses evidence from The Federalist 
bearing on legal questions such as the limits on Congress's power 
to make "regulations and exceptions" to the Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction to keep it from hearing certain classes of 
cases (e.g., those dealing with school prayert or whether the 
28. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE 
COI\OSTITUTION (Herbert J. Storing ed .. 19g5). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. III. § 2: Ex Parte McCardle. 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (upholding 
power of Congress to deprive Court of jurisdiction over class of cases involving habeas 
corpus). The evidence for and against is summarized in ERWII\0 CHEMERII\OSKY. 
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federal government can '"commandeer" state and local 
government officials to implement federal programs (pp. 172. 
210-12).10 Whether one is persuaded by his reading of The 
Federalist is rather beside the point.11 What is important, and 
what Coenen no doubt intends to show by commenting on 
current controversies, is that the questions that preoccupied 
Madison and Hamilton-questions about the scope of federal 
power. the nature of American federalism, and the relation of 
the federal branches to each other-are still with us. Publius's 
concerns are still ours today, two hundred twenty years after 
those essays appeared. 
If the ability of a work to transcend its time and address 
future audiences is part of what makes it a "classic,·· then it is 
little wonder The Federalist is regarded as a classic of American 
political thought. But "classic," alas. also often describes a work 
that people discuss but never actually read. Coenen's valuable 
contribution is to remind us why the work is so important, and to 
spur us to take it off the shelf and read it for ourselves. With 
Dan Coenen's book as your guide. the effort will be a little less 
daunting. 
Co:-.:STITLiTIO:-;AL LAW: PRII'CIPLES A:-;D POLICIES § 2.9 (3d. ed .. 2006 ). 
30. Printz v. United States. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating portion of Brady Bill 
requiring state law enforcement personnel to perform background checks on purchasers 
of firearms). Justices Scalia and Souter both invoked The Federalist to support their 
positions. Compare id. at 919-22 with id. at 971-75 (Souter. J .. dissenting). 
31. rm not persuaded that the exceptions clause in Article III doesn"t mean 
precisely what it says. for example. While it is true that the courts were to be a check on 
the other branches. the exceptions clause. providing as it does at least a theoretical check 
on the Court itself. seems precisely the sort of interlocking check and balance that is 
familiar in the Constitution. 
